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Abstract 
Given a settled reduction in the present level of tax revenue, and by exploring a very 
large combinatorial space of tax structures, in this paper we employ a genetic algorithm 
in order to determine the ‘best’ structure of a real world personal income tax that allows 
for the maximization of the redistributive effect of the tax, while preventing all 
taxpayers being worse off than with the present tax structure. We take Italy as a case 
study. 
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1. Introduction 
Personal income tax (hereafter, PIT) is characterized around the world by several 
parameters that define its structure: marginal tax rates, upper limits of thresholds, 
allowances and deductions, as well as tax credits. Applied to the distribution of income 
observed in a specific country, the PIT structure of that country determines a given tax 
revenue and a given redistributive effect, as well as influences economic efficiency, first 
of all work incentives and tax compliance. 
The existing economic literature represents a fundamental tool for the PIT design and 
for the need of balancing equity and efficiency, as well as social preferences for 
redistribution. This literature first focused on axioms that are required in order to 
equally apportion the burden of taxation among citizens (Mill, 1848; Samuelson, 1947). 
However, starting with the seminal paper by Mirrlees (1971), the theoretical literature 
has mainly focused on the equity-efficiency trade-off in optimum taxation. This is a 
difficult task, since many empirical simulation studies have, in fact, shown that in the 
short-run it is almost impossible to find a tax reform, which does not decrease efficiency 
or equity and, at the same time, is still financially and politically feasible. Moreover, if 
applied to a real-world tax system, most of the results of the economic literature would 
imply considerable modifications of the present tax structure and would certainly affect 
the tax revenue, which is one of the most important concerns that policymakers have to 
face. In other words, governments are certainly interested in setting up a tax system by 
implementing the literature’s results, at least in the long-run. In the short-run, they are 
undoubtedly subject to budget constraints and to the political feasibility of a reform. 
Despite these arguments, the PIT structure is subject to continuous evolution around the 
world. Peter, Buttrick and Duncan (2010) study and categorize the trends in the PIT 
structure over the period of 1981 to 2005 in 189 countries. They show that many 
governments substantially and/or frequently change the PIT structure; according to their 
analysis, about 45 per cent of governments changed at least one parameter of the PIT 
every year. They also emphasize that ‘The high frequency of changes may also be due to 
the gradual enactment of tax reforms that get implemented over several years, fiscal 
policy responses to the business cycle, or continuous experimentation and search for the 
best tax structure.’. 
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This paper focus on these key issues by considering a recently proposed real-world tax 
cut; it evaluates a feasible tax reform by optimizing the government’s target and, in the 
meantime, by exactly complying with the government’s budget constraint. The solution 
for this problem can be obtained by employing a genetic algorithm (hereafter, GA): a 
search heuristic inspired by natural selection, well-suited to the identification of the 
most promising solution to the problem under consideration. To our knowledge, no 
previous attempts at employing GAs for PIT structure optimization exist. The unique 
applications to tax systems deal with other and simpler aspects (Brooks, 2000; Chen and 
Lee, 1997). 
The tax cut, which we study, has recently been implemented by the Italian government. 
In order to increase the purchasing power of ‘poor’ PIT taxpayers, as well as taxpayers 
belonging to the ‘middle class’ (a proxy of the redistributive effect maximization), the 
Italian government recently reduced the PIT revenue by 9.324 billion euros3 (about 6 
per cent of the PIT tax revenue) by introducing a cash transfer of 80 euros per month 
only for employees with a PIT gross income in the range of 8-26 thousand euros (about 
10.9 million taxpayers).4 
Considering this reform, two questions arise: is this tax cut allocation the best one the 
government could have considered? Or, given this settled amount of the tax cut, which 
is the best way to reform the whole PIT structure in order to achieve the highest 
redistributive effect, whilst leaving no taxpayers worse-off with respect to the present 
tax structure? The GA is an appropriate tool, and Italy is a perfect case study, since the 
Italian PIT is very complicated and its structure incorporates more than thirty 
parameters. Our results show that a more general, better, and more equity-oriented 
reform is possible; moreover, this methodology can be applied to any other specific 
target. 
The solution of the problem discussed here faces an equity-efficiency trade-off: in order 
for the redistributive effect to be its highest, the efficiency of the tax (i.e. the level of the 
                                                 
3 According to the official statistics made available by the Department of Finance of the Ministry of Finance (2016), the tax cut 
amounts to 9.1 billion euros and affects 11.3 million taxpayers. 
4 There is a political explanation behind this choice. The government announced that it would reduce PIT liability by 80 euros per 
month for all taxpayers belonging to the middle class. Of course, such an announcement proved to be too expensive; moreover, it 
would have been very difficult to be reached through a PIT structure reform since it is hard to reform such a complex tax structure 
and, in the meantime, ensure an equal tax reduction of 80 euros for all these taxpayers. In order to at least partially meet its 
commitment, the government decided to only apply the 80 euros pledge to a group of taxpayers, given the revenue constraint. In 
order to not modify the PIT structure and ensure exactly 80 euros, it chose the cash transfer instrument. 
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effective marginal tax rates) can worsen. In this first paper we just focus on the equity 
side of the problem. This does not imply that we forget about efficiency; we suggest a 
few constraints to the allowable parameters of tax structure in order to not arrive at both 
trivial and inefficient solutions. 
Even if by employing the ‘best’ tax structure (almost) no taxpayer is worse-off, its 
actual applicability could face political resistance since all parameters of the tax change 
and, consequently, taxpayers could hardly believe that no one is worse-off. We do not 
discuss these political economy inconveniences. Finally, it has to be noted that we also 
do not consider taxpayers’ responses to the new parameters of the tax structure; it is a 
‘short run’ solution that can help policy makers when they think of PIT reform. In order 
to consider taxpayers’ responses further research can be done regarding a long-run 
perspective: for example by modelling the equity-efficiency trade-off in a genetic 
algorithm framework or by employing agent-based models. This is the baseline of our 
further research. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing economic 
literature on the design of the tax system and further explains the motivation of this 
paper. Section 3 describes in greater detail the 2010 structure of the Italian personal 
income tax, the baseline for our analysis. Section 4 presents how tax progressivity and 
the redistributive effect exerted by the tax can be measured. Section 5 shows the data 
and peculiarities of the static micro-simulation model employed for simulations. Section 
6 first describes how genetic algorithms work and it then presents the implementation 
used in this work. Section 7 shows the results, whilst section 8 offers a conclusion. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and Purpose of the Paper 
Given its progressive nature, the PIT is a globally fundamental tool through which the 
redistributive effect of the whole tax system of a country is achieved, even if a large 
variability, in terms of both tax revenue and redistributive effect, is observed around the 
world (Verbist and Figari, 2014; Wagstaff et al., 1999). The two key reasons for this 
variability deal with the role played by social preferences for redistribution (Lefranc, 
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Pistolesi and Trannoy, 2008) and the equity-efficiency trade-off of taxation (Tuomala, 
2016; Saez, 2001; Feldstein, 1976; Sandmo, 1981; Stern, 1976). 
Starting from Mill’s (1848) approach, economic theory has first elaborated precise 
axioms to equally apportion the burden of taxation among citizens. The principle of 
equal sacrifice can thus give normative and positive contents to the ability-to-pay 
principle and justify the tax progressivity. The resulting degree of progressivity depends 
on the amount of tax revenue to be raised, as well as the social welfare function 
characterizing preferences of the society. Within this framework, Young (1990) 
proposed a theoretical strategy in order to test the possibility of stating that a country’s 
lawmaker adopts a precise criterion of distributive justice and a particular social welfare 
function when he determines vertical equity and modifications in the PIT structure (e.g., 
Pellegrino (2008) for an application to the Italian case). Young’s (1990) framework 
does not consider efficiency and incentive effects, so his methodology favours high 
marginal tax rates on higher incomes. Beliant and Gouveia (1993) introduce incentive 
effects within Young’s (1990) methodology, finding conditions for progressive taxation 
similar to the standard ones elaborated by Samuelson (1947). 
On the other hand, Mirrlees (1971) introduces the theory of optimal direct taxation, 
which also deals with the equity-efficiency trade-off. As the real-world PIT systems are 
very complex, empirical applications of the optimal income tax theory are based on 
stylized tax, which involve only a few tax parameters. Within this framework, the most 
effective estimation difficulties deal with the economic behaviour modelling since the 
labour supply responses (Bargain et al., 2014; Aaberge and Colombino, 2013; Blundell 
and Shephard, 2011) and the tax base responses to tax changes have to be introduced 
and parameterized (Saez, 2001; Saez, Slemrod and Giertz, 2012). 
On the contrary, governments have to face PIT structures composed by several 
parameters and, most importantly, the PIT structure observed in a country (in a given 
year) is the result of several and partial adjustments that have occurred over the previous 
years. Focusing on those aspects, this paper differs from the existing literature for 
several reasons. First of all, it has a different the point of view from which the PIT 
reform is evaluated. Usually, the existing empirical literature evaluates the effects of a 
tax reform after the government introduces it. On the contrary, in this paper, we 
consider the government’s point of view before such a reform is introduced. 
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Let us consider a generic government. Every year, this government plans finance law, 
which sets the annual adjustments on the level of the overall value of public spending 
and tax revenue to be obtained by the current legislation, in order to achieve some 
specific goals (such as the level of the government deficit) set in the long-term budget. 
One possible adjustment is the level of the PIT revenue. Starting from the actual PIT 
structure, the government may then want to cut PIT revenue in order to increase the 
purchasing power of taxpayers; conversely, it may want to increase the redistributive 
effect of the tax leaving the tax revenue unchanged; or, it may want to increase tax 
revenue by letting the richest taxpayers face the whole tax increase, or it may want to 
modify the PIT structure in order to reduce the inefficiencies of the tax. These are, of 
course, only some explanatory perspectives. Whatever the target, which parameters of 
the tax should be changed in order to optimize it? How much should they change? Or, 
more generally, how should the whole PIT structure change? Given this target, it is not 
the case that policy-makers consider these questions when thinking of such a PIT 
reform. In order to implement a reform, the government usually changes some 
parameters of the tax compatible with its revenue constraint. Whether such a tax 
structure change is aimed at achieving the best way to obtain the specific target is 
debatable. The perspective discussed here can therefore be useful in setting a short-run 
tax reform. Apart from exceptional cases, the tax cuts represent a small percentage of 
the overall revenue of the tax; on one hand, results of the economic literature can be 
only guidelines for the implementation of such a reduction; on the other hand, the 
government is primarily interested in correctly forecasting the tax reduction, given its 
balanced budget constraint. 
 
 
3. The Personal Income Tax in the 2010 Fiscal Year: Technical Details 
Let ix  be the personal gross income of taxpayer i  ni ...,,2,1 . The 2010 Italian tax 
law considers two different kinds of deductions: 1id  is deduction for the main residence 
cadastral income; 2id  is the sum of deductions for social security contributions and 
alimonies as well as donations. The taxable income iy  is evaluated as: 
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From 2007 onwards the rate schedule  iyS  contemplates 5 thresholds as reported in 
Table 1. The upper limits 1 jj LLUL   4,3,2,1j  of thresholds are 15, 28, 55, 75 
thousand euros, being the first lower limit 01 LL ; tax rates jt  range between 23 and 
43 per cent. 
 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
By applying the rate schedule to the tax base the gross tax liability iGT  is obtained. 
In order to determine the net tax liability iT , tax law admits three distinct kinds of 
effective tax credits. They are: tax credits for earned income  MRii xc1 , tax credits for 
dependent individuals within the household  MRii xc2 , and tax credits for items of 
expenditure 3ic , where 
1
ii
MR
i dxx  . 
The net tax liability iT  is then evaluated as: 
       
   






321
321321
0 i
MR
ii
MR
iii
i
MR
ii
MR
iiii
MR
ii
MR
iii
i
cxcxcGTif
cxcxcGTifcxcxcGT
T  (2) 
In what follows we do not consider regional and municipal surtaxes and then we evaluate 
taxpayer i’s net income as iii Txz  . 
Focusing on tax credits for employees and pensioners as well as self-employed, 
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where 1t  is the lowest marginal tax rate (23 per cent); rm  with )4,3,2,1(r  (the level 
of MRix  below which taxpayers have a nil net tax liability) is equal to 8,000 euros for 
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employees  1m , 7,500 for pensioners younger than 75  2m , 7,750 for pensioners older 
than 75  3m , 4,800 for the self-employed  4m , and zero for non-working taxpayers; 
ra  is equal to 502 euros for employees  1a , 470 for pensioners younger than 75  2a , 
486 for pensioners older than 75  3a , zero for self-employed  4a ; b, that ranges from 
10 to 40 euros in the bandwidth 23-28 thousand euros, is applied only to employees (as 
discussed later, we always set 0b  in simulations). Non-working taxpayers have no 
tax credit for earned incomes. Finally, this tax credit decreases from zero to 4m , and 
from 4m  to 4LL  only for self-employed taxpayers. 
Four different tax credits for type of relationship are allowed: tax credit for dependent 
children  MRiHi xc2 , further tax credit for households with more than three children HFic2 , 
tax credit for dependent spouse  MRiSi xc2 , and tax credit for other household 
components  MRiOi xc2 . The overall value for  MRii xc2  is then 
       MRiOiMRiSiHFiMRiHiMRii xcxccxcxc 22222  . In particular, 
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where 


4
1l
lff  is the overall number of dependent children; 1f  is the number of 
dependent children older than 3 years if the dependent children within the household are 3 
or less; 2f  is the number of dependent children younger than 3 years if the dependent 
children within the household are 3 or less; 3f  is the number of dependent children older 
than 3 years if the dependent children within the household are more than 3; 4f  is the 
number of dependent children younger than 3 years if the dependent children within the 
household are more than 3; e is equal to 15,000 euros; q is equal to 95,000; 



4
1
22
l
Hpl
il
Hp
i cfc ; the present values for the potential tax credits are: 800
12 Hpic , 
90022 Hpic , 000,1
32 Hpic , 100,1
42 Hpic  euros. 
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Moreover, whenever   02 MRiHi xc  and the dependent children within the households are 
more than 3, the tax law admits a further tax credit HFic
2  equal to 1,200 euros for all 
beneficiaries. The tax credits for dependent children have to be split between spouses 
whenever both of them have a positive gross income. Finally, 
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and 
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where u is equal to 110 euros, w  is equal to 40 thousand euros, k is equal to 80 thousand 
euros, Spic
2  is equal to 800 euros and Opic
2  is equal to 750 euros. The present tax code 
considers higher values than uc Spi 
2  in the income range 29,000-35,200 euros. Instead 
of 690 euros, in this income range values ranging from 700 to 720 euros are applied. 
We do not consider these differences in simulations, always letting uc Spi 
2  be equal to 
the same value. 
Tax credits for items of expenditures 3ic  can be classified in two groups according to the 
percentage of the expense the tax law admits as a tax credit. There are expenses that 
allow a tax credit of 19 per cent and 36 per cent, respectively.5 The 19 per cent tax 
credits (we label this variable expenditure1) are very large, 19 different cases, such as 
expenses for health care, mortgage interests, etc.; 36 per cent tax credits (expenditure2) 
are allowed for home restructuring-related expenses. All together, tax law admits 30 
different tax credits for items of expenditure. Finally, tax law admits a tax credit for 
tenants; it is 300 euros if 494,15ix  (we label this variable tenants1); 150 if 
                                                 
5 The tax code considers also a 55 per cent tax credit for interventions for energy saving and a 20 per cent tax credit for purchasing 
of a washing machine. Because of the low number of taxpayers interested in these two kinds of tax credits, we did not considered 
them in the micro-simulation model. 
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987,30494,15  ix  (tenants2); 992 euros if 494,15ix  and if the taxpayers are 
younger than 30 (tenants3). 
 
 
4. Distribution of Income and Personal Income Tax Progressivity 
Let nxxx ...,,, 21  be the pre-tax income levels associated to n income units. The 
corresponding post-tax income levels and tax levels are nzzz ...,,, 21  and nTTT ...,,, 21 , 
respectively. We denote the pre-tax and the post-tax income distribution as well as the 
tax distribution by X, Z and T, respectively. 
As is well known, inequality among pre- and post-tax income levels as well as tax levels 
can be evaluated by the Gini coefficient. Let XG , ZG  and TG  be the corresponding Gini 
coefficient for pre-tax income, post-tax incomes and taxes, respectively. Then, 
 

 
 )(,cov2 F
G           (7) 
where TZX ,, ,   is the average value for pre-tax and post-tax incomes and taxes, 
cov represents the covariance and  F  is the cumulative distribution function. 
After the tax, it is not guaranteed that post-tax ordering be equal to the pre-tax income 
one. Indeed, it is most likely that these two orderings differ because of the re-ranking 
due to the tax. Therefore, the inequality of Z and T can be evaluated once these 
distributions are ordered according to the corresponding pre-tax incomes, ranked in a 
non-decreasing order. For what concerns post-tax incomes and taxes, the corresponding 
concentration coefficient can then be evaluated as follows: 
 

 
 )(,cov2 XF
C           (8) 
Progressive taxation produces two different effects on the distribution of pre-tax 
incomes: post-tax income inequality is lower than that measured on pre-tax income 
distribution, whilst tax inequality is greater. The first effect is known as the 
redistributive effect of the tax and the second one as departure from proportionality of 
the progressive taxation (Lambert, 2001). The overall redistributive effect of the tax RE 
can be evaluated as 
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    APKZZZXZX RRSCGCGGGRE      (9) 
where ZX CGRS   is the Reynolds-Smolensky index, whilst ZZ
APK CGR   is the 
Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index. The more the tax is progressive, the greater RE and 
RS; the more the tax causes re-ranking, the greater the negative contribution of re-
ranking to the overall redistributive effect. Note that if the tax does not cause re-ranking 
0APKR , then RSRE  . 
The departure from proportionality of the progressive taxation can instead be evaluated 
by the Kakwani index XT GCK  . The Kakwani and the Reynolds-Smolensky 
indexes are linked by the overall average tax rate  , namely 




n
i
i
n
i
i
x
T
1
1
          (10) 
As a consequence, KRS




1
. This formula tells us that the Reynolds-Smolensky 
index has two determinants: the overall average tax rate and the Kakwani index. 
In what follows we focus only on the Reynolds-Smolensky index and then we are 
interested in finding the ‘best’ tax structure able to determine a given tax revenue 
(smaller than the present one) and to yield to the greatest RS while getting no loser 
taxpayers. Since we impose a reduction of the tax revenue, note that the value of   will 
be smaller than the present one. Note also that the simulated K will be greater than the 
present one in order for RS to be the highest. 
 
 
5. The Data and the Static Micro-simulation Model 
In order to design the tax reform, we rely on a static micro-simulation model written in 
STATA (technical details are available in Pellegrino et al. (2011)) that employs, as 
input data, those provided by the Bank of Italy in its Survey on Household Income and 
Wealth (hereafter, BI-SHIW), published in 2012 with regard to the 2010 fiscal year. It 
estimates the most important taxes and contributions which characterise the Italian 
fiscal system. Here we employ the micro-simulation model module concerning the PIT. 
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The BI-SHIW survey contains information on household income and wealth in the year 
2010, covering 7,951 households and 19,836 individuals (Bank of Italy, 2012). The 
sample is representative of the Italian population, composed of about 24 million 
households and 60 million individuals. 
The BI-SHIW survey provides information only on each individual’s disposable 
income, which considers items of income that are taxed within the PIT or that can be 
exempt from the tax, as well as can be taxed under a separate regime. Therefore, the 
micro-simulation model first distinguishes all incomes included in the PIT taxable 
income definition, incomes exempt from any taxes and incomes taxed under a separate 
regime. Then the PIT gross income distribution is evaluated, starting from the PIT net 
income distribution. The transition from the post- to the pre-tax personal income of each 
individual has been computed by applying the algorithm proposed by Immervoll and 
O’Donoghue (2001). 
Using original sample weights, the grossing-up procedure simply proportions the sum 
of individuals’ sample weights to the dimension of the population as estimated by the 
National Statistical Office (ISTAT). Then the grossed-up number of PIT taxpayers has 
been obtained by considering individuals with a positive gross income within the 
sample (13,791 taxpayers), corresponding to about 40 million in the population. 
Considering the income units, results concerning the PIT gross income distribution are 
very close to the Ministry of Finance’s (2011) official statistics, both considering the 
gross income distribution by income classes and the composition of PIT income units 
by work status, as well as by their mean gross income. In addition, the overall tax 
revenue resulting from the micro-simulation model (148.748 billion euros) is very close 
to that showed in the official statistics. As a consequence, this instrument is suitable for 
the type of empirical analysis we propose. 
Considering all individual taxpayers, Figure 1 compares the frequency density function 
obtained with the micro-simulation model and the one obtained using the Ministry of 
Finance’s official data by income classes. Similar pictures emerge considering the 
frequency density function for pensioners and employees, as well as the self-employed. 
 
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
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The column ‘Present value’ of Table 2 shows the inequality indices for individual 
taxpayers in the 2010 fiscal year, which is our reference situation for the Reynolds-
Smolensky index maximization. The Gini coefficient for the gross income distribution 
is 0.44338, whilst that for the net income distribution is 0.39138. The overall 
redistributive effect RE is 0.05200. The concentration coefficient for the net income 
distribution is 0.39076, whilst that on the net tax liability distribution is 0.67215; 
therefore, the Reynolds-Smolensky RS index is equal to 0.05262 and the Kakwani index 
K is 0.22877. The overall average tax rate is 18.70 per cent, whilst the Atkinson-
Plotnick-Kakwani APKR  index is equal to 0.00062. 
 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
Table 2 (column ‘With cash transfer’) also shows the overall redistributive impact of 
PIT joined with the cash transfer i . i  favours only employees with a PIT gross 
income in the range of 8-26 thousand euros (about 10.9 million taxpayers), as follows: 












0)(&000,260
0)(&000,26000,24
000,2
000,26
960
0)(&000,24960
1
1
1
1
MR
iiii
MR
iiii
i
MR
iiii
i
xcGTxif
xcGTxif
x
xcGTxmif
  (11) 
It does not modify the PIT structure at all. Beneficiaries obtain i , and continue to pay 
the same amount of PIT net tax liability iT . The net effect iiii Tyz 
*  is an 
increase in these taxpayers’ disposable income by 960 euros per year, in the income 
range 8-24 thousands euros and a decreasing amount up to 26 thousand euros. Note also 
that if iiT   beneficiaries obtain a subsidy. Taxpayers other than employees, on the 
contrary, do not gain from this cash transfer. According to our microsimulation model, 
the cost of this measure is 9.324 billion euros. 
Even if only one taxpayer out of four obtains the cash transfer, the redistributive effect 
of the PIT joined with the transfer considerably improves: the Reynolds-Smolensky RS 
index increases by 8.46 per cent; on the contrary, the overall redistributive effect RE 
increases only by 7.92 per cent, since the Atkinson-Plotnik-Kakwani APKR  index 
worsens by 54 per cent. On the efficiency side, the effective marginal tax rate resulting 
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in the income range of 24-26 thousand euros increases by up to 80 per cent; for all other 
income levels, on the contrary, the effective marginal tax rates do not change with 
respect to the present tax structure. 
By employing a GA, in the next sections, we show that a more equity-oriented reform is 
possible. From the methodological point of view, the specific measure employed by the 
Italian government is not particularly interesting; it refers only to employees and then, a 
few parameters of the tax could be simultaneously changed in a GA framework, i.e. 
parameters defining the structure of the tax credit for employees. We discuss an overall 
reform, which considers all the parameters of the tax are able to be trimmed. Since we 
split the tax cut among all taxpayers, both the average reduction of the net tax liability 
for all taxpayers and the value of APKR  are smaller than that guaranteed to employees 
by the government’s cash transfer. 
 
 
6. Genetic Algorithm 
6.1. General Overview 
Genetic algorithms (GAs) are a heuristic search which belong to the field of 
evolutionary algorithms, a subfield of artificial intelligence. Since their inception 
(Holland, 1975), GAs found a wealth of applications in the most varied research 
disciplines, beyond computational science, mathematics, physics, bioinformatics, etc. 
Applications in economics also exist, broadly including game theory, public economics 
(Brooks, 2000; Chen and Lee, 1997), finance related works (Sermpinis et al., 2015), 
schedule optimization and whenever some sort of learning mechanism is needed; 
historically, the first attempt at employing GAs in economics is due to Miller’s (1986) 
research on adaptive behaviour. 
Up to date, there is not an application employing GAs for a tax system optimization; a 
similar structure of the GA here developed has been however applied in other branch of 
economics, as in the paper by Lin and Liu (2008). This is a previous example 
application of GAs to, at large, economics-related problems, portfolio optimization in 
particular. As it is often the case, GAs are chosen as a last-resort strategy when other 
optimization strategies fail, or are infeasible, due to the impossibility to describe the 
problem in a closed form. 
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The huge solutions search space, which is the aftermath of the combinatorial effect of 
very many parameters, posing a serious challenge to traditional optimization techniques; 
brute force methods are out of the question, just like iterative methods (cfr. Newton’s); 
GAs appear as an obviously appropriate choice. 
Candidate solutions, which in the GA are internally represented as ‘individuals’ (each of 
them is characterized by her own ‘genome’, a vector of ‘chromosomes’)6, are generated 
as an initial ‘population’ at random. Evolutionary operators iteratively select, cross-
breed and mutate the best (most ‘fit’, according to an objective function called ‘fitness 
function’) ‘individuals’, in order to produce an offspring of ‘individuals’ – the 
subsequent ‘generation’ – that will enter a new reproduction step. The ‘individuals’’ 
average fitness increases after every generation, until a satisfactory solution is found. 
The stopping criterion normally employed is related to the ‘population’ homogeneity: as 
the search process becomes closer to an optimum, the ‘individuals’ become more and 
more similar among them. 
Detailing the trimming of the GAs technical parameters is out of the scope of this work; 
suffice it to say, as agreed upon by a vast literature, it is an ad-hoc process, to be 
performed mostly by trial and error, on every specific search domain. 
 
6.2. The Structure of the Genetic Algorithm We Employ 
The static micro-simulation model had to be re-implemented in a more versatile way, in 
order for the kind of analysis we are interested in to be feasible. We rewrote the 
modules of the micro-simulation model evaluating the Italian PIT in Python, a very 
mainstream language that conveniently allows for the use of parallel computing 
techniques, distributed across multiple nodes. Python also offers an excellent 
compromise between agility in programming – providing the developers with several 
libraries optimized for numerical calculations – and computational performance. 
The GA implementation employed in this work is based on Python’s open-source 
Pyevolve library (Perone, 2009). The ‘population’ selection mechanism across 
generations is the standard roulette wheel (fitness proportional) with elitism selection 
(the best 5 individuals in each generation are kept unaltered and carried over across 
                                                 
6 In the early GA implementations (BCGA, binary-coded genetic algorithms), the solutions space had to be coded in binary 
numbers; RCGA, real-coded genetic algorithms, allow working with variables in continuous domains; cfr. Herrera et al. (1998). 
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successive generations), while the evolutionary crossover operator is a standard one-
point and is set equal to 0.85. For what concerns the mutation operator, we employed a 
random gaussian operator, replacing (with a 0.03 rate) values x with ),0( Nx  , where 
0.2  has been determined to be the best. Therefore, a low mutation rate value and a 
high crossover rate have been utilized, in order to let the search process converge 
reasonably quickly on solutions, whilst maintaining the ability to escape local maxima. 
The “population size vs. number of generations” trade-off has been tackled and solved, 
favouring a small population vs. numerous evolutionary steps. 
As the starting point, we let the GA set up a ‘population’ of 200 different tax structures 
(‘individuals’ from the GA point of view) and then we let it evolve them for 10,000 
‘generations’. Consequently, the GA has to evaluate as much as 2 million candidate 
solutions, applying all these different tax structures to the same pre-tax income 
distribution, composed of 13,791 taxpayers. 
 
6.2.1. Setting Up the Problem and the Choice of the Fitness Function 
We are interested in coming up with a reasonable tax structure that inhibits both trivial 
and inefficient solutions. The GA then has to be provided with a few specific constraints 
that have to be obeyed, in terms of some parameters of the tax structure. If this was not 
the case, problematic solutions would appear. For example, having to find the highest 
redistributive effect with no constraints at all, the GA would certainly impose 
excessively high marginal tax rates on higher income earners and a zero marginal tax 
rate on too many of the poorest taxpayers; as a result, a polarization of tax rates and 
bandwidths of thresholds would appear and the tax revenue would consequently be too 
high. Or the GA would disproportionately favour high levels of some peculiar tax 
credits, simply because they are enjoyed by a small group of taxpayers, resulting in a 
negligible impact on the tax revenue, but in awkward preferential treatment for some 
income groups. 
In order to avoid these unpleasant outcomes, we imposed two constraints. 
First, we impose a condition that no taxpayers should be worse off as a result of the tax 
reform; that is, all taxpayers must pay a lower (or, at most, equal) amount of taxes than 
the present one. Therefore, since the Italian personal income tax does not allow for 
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negative income taxation, and as we are looking for a tax reform with no losing 
taxpayers, we let the ‘no tax area’ be greater, or at least equal, to the present one. We 
also require the highest marginal tax rate as well as the lower limit of the top threshold, 
to be lower, or at most equal, to the present values, and the upper limit of the bottom 
threshold to be greater, or at most equal, to the present value. 
Second, we keep the rank applied by the present tax structure to certain kinds of tax 
credits unchanged: for example, the present tax credit applied to employees is greater 
than the one applied to pensioners, and the one applied to pensioners is greater than that 
which is applied to self-employed taxpayers; similarly, the tax credit for tenants is 
greater with regard to younger ones. 
In doing so, we do not allow the GA to run free with too ‘imaginative’ solutions. 
Then, we have to define our target: we are interested in obtaining the highest possible 
redistributive effect of the tax. To measure it, we refer to the Reynolds-Smolensky RS 
index, given by the difference between the Gini coefficient for the pre-tax income 
distribution and the corresponding concentration coefficient for the post-tax 
distribution. Instead of the equivalent household gross and net income distributions, we 
refer to the taxpayers’ ones. The main reasons are twofold: the cash transfer introduced 
by the Italian government favours taxpayers; this is the first exercise that employs a 
genetic algorithm for a tax system optimization, so that by observing the composition of 
the tax cut by income classes, we can ensure that our result is among the ‘best’ (by 
referring to the equivalent household income distribution, this check could be much 
harder to assess). The sensitivity analysis we made on the GA ‘best’ result confirms the 
optimality of the solution discussed here; results are available upon request. 
For each tax structure and each taxpayer, the GA computes all the relevant tax variables 
in the transition from the pre- to the post-tax income. For each tax structure, it then 
computes the overall tax revenue, the share of loser taxpayers by considering each 
taxpayer’s actual net tax liability, the average loss for the loser taxpayers, as well as the 
Reynolds-Smolensky RS index (these are the four parts of the objective fitness function 
to maximize, see below); it then saves the resulting values on a dump file. We employ a 
computer powerful enough to evaluate 2 million runs in about 4 days; the duration of 
our average run is then 0.18 seconds. 
The GA has to maximize a fitness function. We employed 
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10


RS
efitness         (12) 
where   is the percentage deviation of the computed tax revenue of each run from the 
target one (139.424 billion euros, 9.324 billion euros less than the present tax revenue), 
whilst   is the share of taxpayers losing with the simulated tax structure,   is the 
average loss (in euros) for the loser taxpayers,  ,  ,   and   are all positive 
parameters. We fix 580 , 53 , 20  and 1150 . We made several attempts, 
with different parameters and different functional forms; this fitness function has proved 
to be the most effective. 
The exponential form of the fitness function helps the GA to always converge to the 
‘best’ solution, since generation after generation, more-than-linearly high scores are 
assigned to the most promising candidate solutions. 
The first term of the exponent shows the part of the fitness function depending on RS. 
We highly favour RS with respect to  ,  , and  , since we are interested in obtaining 
the highest Reynolds-Smolensky index. The second and third, as well as the fourth 
terms of the exponent of the fitness function, show the ‘penalties’ we impose on the 
fitness value when  ,   and   became too large. As a result, the smaller  ,   and 
 , the more the fitness value increases. The parameter   is crucial for the convergence 
of the GA: there are combinatorial spaces where RS increases even if   increases; a 
low value for   allows the GA to attribute low scores to those candidate solutions. 
When the GA has evolved for a reasonable number of generations, we obtain 0 , 
0 , the smallest  , and the highest RS. The parameters of the ‘best’ structure of the 
tax can then be observed. 
Figure 2 shows the maximum value of the fitness function applied in this work for each 
generation. As can be noted, the maximum value tends to increase generation after 
generation. The highest fitness value is 26.93. 
 
FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
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6.2.2. The Choice of Chromosomes 
Each candidate tax structure is characterized by 33 different parameters, each of them 
related to a specific parameter of the Italian PIT structure described in Section 2. In 
order to evaluate each of the 33 parameters, the GA couples 36 ‘chromosomes’ that are 
values ranging from zero to 1. 
We now turn to describing how we let the GA trim each ‘chromosome’. 
First of all, we let the GA choose five marginal tax rates as in the actual tax code. Given 
the constraints we impose, we know that the top marginal tax rate cannot be too much 
higher than the present one (since we impose a ‘no loser’ taxpayers’ constraint); 
moreover, we do not want it to be higher than the present value. Conversely, we do not 
know the minimum allowable value of the bottom marginal tax rate; we set the lowest 
marginal tax rate at not lower than 17 per cent (being the present value equal to 23 per 
cent). 
In particular, the GA randomly sets a group of six chromosomes serving for the 
definition of the five marginal tax rates. It then adds them up in order to obtain a 
normalization value as follows: 



 6
1
17.043.0

chromosome
normt . 
The GA finally chooses the five tax rates t  with )5,4,3,2,1(  as follows: 
tnormchromosomet 





1
*17.0 . 
We then set a second group of 5 chromosomes (7-11) defining the four upper limits 
1 jj LLUL  of the thresholds, being 01 LL  by definition and 1 jj ULUL . We applied 
an empirical strategy similar to that employed for the definition of the marginal tax rates 
and we impose 1.000,151 UL  (see on for the choice of this value) and we let the 
highest value of 4UL  be 75 thousand euros (as in the present tax structure). As a 
consequence, 



 11
7
1.000,15000,75

chromosome
normUL  
and, for 4,3,2,1j , 
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


j
ULj normchromosomeUL
1
*1.000,15

 . 
Afterwards, we define 25 chromosomes related to the tax credits’ structure. Starting at 
the tax credit for employees (Equation (3)), we let the GA choose the no tax area 1m  
applied to employees, that is the limit of pre-tax income below which these taxpayers 
face a zero net tax liability, between 8 thousand euros (the present value) and 1*UL : 
 000,8**000,8 1121  ULchromosomem  . We set 15
8
 , equal to the present 
value. Note that 1.000,151 UL  ensures 1m  to be properly set. 
The choice of the parameter   influences the equity-efficiency trade-off. The higher 
the value chosen by the GA, the more likely the slope of the effective marginal tax 
credit in the income level 2LLmr   is high; therefore, the higher the effective marginal 
tax rate for this income bandwidth.7 The constraint we impose on the share of loser 
taxpayers lets the GA choose the highest admissible value for 1m  and at the same time 
keep under control the level of the effective marginal tax rates (see on). 
The GA then choose 432 ,, mmm  as follows: 
   
 
11514
211423
11312
*3.0**6.0
*96875.0*
*9375.0*2.0**9375.0
mchromosomemm
mmchromosomemm
mchromosomemm



 
where 0.2 and 0.3 are arbitrarily chosen, whilst 
1
29375.0
m
m
 , 
1
396875.0
m
m
 , and 
1
46.0
m
m
  are the corresponding values according to the present tax structure. In so 
doing, we let the GA choose rm  with )4,3,2,1(r  in a large combinatorial space 
preserving the present rank of rm . 
                                                 
7 If we let the GA to run free with respect to this parameter, for example by letting the GA choose it up to 1, a lower than 1 value 
would be chosen (given the constraints we impose), a higher redistributive effect would be obtained, as well as a confiscatory 
effective tax rate for incomes just above the ‘no tax area’. The reason is clear: ceteris paribus, having to maximize the Reynolds-
Smolensky index given a revenue constraint, the larger the share of taxpayers with a nil net tax liability, the higher the Reynolds-
Smolensky index (and the higher the tax rates and narrower the upper limit of each threshold in order to obtain the target tax 
revenue). As a consequence, the larger the ‘no tax area’, the narrower the income bandwidth between the ‘no tax area’ and the upper 
limit of the bottom threshold, and then the more sharply the subsequent reduction of the effective tax credit. 
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Having the GA chosen 1t  and rm , note that the potential tax credits rmt1  are 
automatically defined. We then let the GA choose also the parameters ra  with 
)3,2,1(r  in the range  rmt10   by defining chromosomes 16, 17, and 18 (as 
described in Section 2, according to the actual tax code the parameter 4a  is equal to 
zero and we keep it unchanged). In so doing, a very large combination of tax credits for 
earned incomes is allowable. 
Finally, we always set the parameter b equal to zero. In 2010 fiscal year, it is applied 
only to employees and its values range from 10 to 40 euros for levels of MRix  belonging 
to the threshold 23-28 thousand euros. We prefer this parameter to be fixed at zero 
since, if it were positive, it would not let the tax credit under discussion be a continuous 
function for all levels of MRix . Finally, note that we do not let the effective tax credits 
for earned income be piecewise decreasing with respect to limits others than those 
observed in the rate schedule. If  MRii xc1  were piecewise decreasing with respect to 
other thresholds, the number and the level of effective marginal tax rates would not be 
under control, leading to unpleasant and inefficient outcomes. 
We continue by defining specific chromosomes, in order to set the combinatory space 
for the three tax credits for dependent individuals within the household:  MRiHi xc2 , 
 MRiSi xc2  and  MRiOi xc2 . 
Starting with the tax credits for dependent children  MRiHi xc2 , we let the GA choose the 
potential level of the tax credits Hplic
2  in the range 600-5,000 euros (being the present 
values ranging between 800 and 1,100 euros). Similar to the choice of the tax rates and the 
upper limits of the thresholds, we then define 5 different chromosomes (from 19 to 23) to 
set the 4 kinds of tax credits for dependent children. In so doing, we set specific 
constraints, in order to let the potential tax credit be higher for households with more than 
3 children and lower for those with fewer than 3 children, as well as higher for children 
aged 3 or less and lower for a child aged more than 3. Then we introduce chromosomes 24 
and 25 for the choice of parameters q and e. We let the GA choose q between 30 and 200 
thousand euros (being the present value equal to 95 thousand), and the parameter e 
between zero and 75 thousand euros (being the present value equal to 15 thousand). Note 
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that these are very large ranges, so that the GA can choose an extremely large set of 
combinations. Finally, the GA chooses chromosome 26 in order to set HFic
2  between zero 
and 2,000 euros (being the actual value 1,200 euros). 
Turning to the effective tax credit for the spouse  MRiSi xc2 , we generate chromosome 27 
in order for Spic
2  to range between 500 and 2,500 euros (being the present value equal to 
800 euros), and a further chromosome 28 in order for the parameter u to range between 
zero and Spic
2 . Chromosomes 27 and 28 let the effective tax credit for the spouse be a 
non-increasing function with respect to MRix  and let the GA choose among a very large 
combination of structures for this tax credit. 
Looking at Equation (5), this effective tax credit  MRiSi xc2  is piecewise linearly 
decreasing with respect to three thresholds: from zero to 2LL , from 2LL  to 
43 LLwLL  , and from w to 5LLk  . In order to define w and k, we introduced 
chromosomes 29 and 30 as follows: 
 24292 * LLLLchromosomeLLw   
)000,150(*30 wchromosomewk   
Finally, concerning the tax credit for other dependent individuals within the household, we 
introduce chromosome 31 in order for Opic
2  to range between 12*75.0 Hpic  and 
12*95.0 Hpic , and we impose  MRiOi xc2  to be linearly decreasing between zero and k, and 
to be zero if kxMRi  . 
Afterwards, we let the GA choose chromosomes 32, 33 and 34 in order to set tax credits 
for tenants: 
500,1*321 chromosometenants   
1332 *tenantschromosometenants   
)2*(* 13413 tenantschromosometenantstenants   
According to the present tax code, these tax credits are applied to two income 
thresholds: 15,494 and 30,987 euros; we consider this aspect by letting them change 
according to 1UL  and 2UL . 
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Finally, the GA chooses chromosomes 35 and 36 in order to set the percentage of the 
expenses the tax law admits as further tax credits for items of expenditure. We let it 
chose expenditure1 between 0 and 70 per cent (at present equal to 19), and expenditure2 
between 20 and 90 per cent (at present equal to 36). 
 
 
7. Results 
Table 3 shows all the parameters of the ‘best’ tax structure able to maximize the 
Reynolds-Smolensky RS index, given that the tax revenue is exactly 9.324 billion euros 
lower than the present one and (almost) no taxpayers have to be worse-off due to the tax 
reform. 
 
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
As can be noted, the bottom marginal tax rate 1t  significantly decreases from 23 to 
21.39 per cent; its reduction lowers the gross tax liability, not only for the poorest 
taxpayers but also for all the other taxpayers; 4t  also decreases from 41 to 40.70 per 
cent; as expected, 5t  is set to its maximum admittable value (43 per cent). On the 
contrary, the other two marginal tax rates increase: 2t  from 27 to 30.66 per cent, and 3t  
from 38 to 38.99 per cent. 
In terms of the bandwidth of the thresholds, the first one broadens from 0-15,000 to 0-
20,815.53 euros, whilst the second narrows from 15,000-28,000 to 20,815.53-27,314.58 
euros. No remarkable changes can be observed for the bandwidth of the third and fourth 
thresholds; the upper limits of the third threshold increases from 55,000 to 55,551.83 
euros, whilst that of the fourth decreases from 75,000 to 72,757.14. 
The ‘no tax’ area enlarges for all four kinds of taxpayer: 1m  increases from 8,000 to 
11,070.33 euros, 2m  from 7,500 to 10,031.52, 3m  from 7,750 to 10,523.08, whilst 4m  
rises from 4,800 to 5,841.36. As expected, 
1
1
UL
m
 is set to (almost) its maximum value. 
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The parameters that define the shape of the effective tax credits for earned income 
increase considerably: 1a  from 502 to 1,489.72 euros, 2a  from 470 to 1,392.05, and 3a  
from 486 to 1,393.99 euros (note that in all cases the GA sets rr mta 1 ). 
Since we impose the tax credit )(1 MRii xc  piecewise decreasing with respect to rm , 2LL  
and 4LL , its shape does not change with respect to those originally observed, as shown 
in Figure 3, for what concerns employees (similar pictures emerge if pensioners and 
self-employed are considered). 
 
FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
However, after the reform, the slope of the effective tax credit in the income range 
 21 LLm   is higher (in absolute value). Such a change affects the level of the effective 
marginal tax rates (EMTRs) in this income bandwidth, which increase with respect to 
the ones observed before the tax reform (Figure 4). 
 
FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
Therefore, an equity-efficiency trade-off emerges; in order for the Reynolds-Smolensky 
index to be the highest, we have to agree to higher EMTRs for taxpayers belonging to 
the income range 21 ULm  . In order to lower the effective marginal tax rate on the 
bottom of the income distribution, a lower value for parameter   should be set and/or 
high values for parameter ra  should be denied; RS would necessarily decrease. 
The shape of the tax credit for a spouse  MRiSi xc2  is similar to the present one (Figure 
5). 
 
FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE 
 
Both the potential tax credit and the effective tax credit are higher than before (except in 
the income range wUL 1 ); the effective one becomes zero above 00.204,116k  
euros, whilst parameter w decreases from 40,000 euros to 34,994.19. 
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In terms of tax credits for dependent children, the two tax credits for children, if the 
dependent children within the household are 3 or less, are very similar to those observed 
before the tax reform: 12Hpic  decreases from 800 to 700.48 euros, whilst 
22Hp
ic  decreases 
from 900 to 774.79 euros. The other two tax credits are significantly higher: both of them 
are set equal to 1,218.04 euros. Even if 32Hpic  and 
42Hp
ic  are only a little bit higher than 
before, the GA sets HFic
2  equal to zero. 
The income limits above which this tax credit becomes zero substantially change: q is 
equal to 110,937.33, whilst e is equal to 41,485.32. A similar picture emerges when 
considering the tax credit for other dependent individuals within a household: the 
potential tax credit is a little lower than the present value (665.46 euros), and it is 
positive for income below 116,204.00 euros. 
Focusing on the remaining parameters of the tax, the tax credits for tenants are close to 
those observed before the tax reform: the tax credit for taxpayers with gross income 
below 1UL  is 439.68 euros as opposed to 300, the tax credit for tenants with income in 
the range 21 ULUL   is set to 187.00 euros instead of 150, whilst the tax credit for 
younger tenants is set to 732.90 euros instead of 992. 
Finally, the percentages of expenses that the tax law admits as a tax credit also remain 
relatively unchanged: 19.42 per cent instead of 19 per cent, and 41.46 per cent instead 
of 36 per cent. 
Very few taxpayers are worse-off as a result of this tax reform (0.85 per cent and, on 
average, they lose 26.57 euros per year), whilst 24.48 per cent are unaffected (we 
consider the taxpayers, for whom the absolute value of the computed net tax liability 
differs from the present one by, at most, one euro, as unaffected). 
The remaining 74.67 per cent of taxpayers gain from the reform. Looking at the 
composition of the tax cut in terms of income classes, 93.31 per cent of the tax cut 
favours taxpayers in the income range of 8-28 thousands euros, whilst 1.93 per cent 
favours taxpayers with lower incomes (Table 4). 
 
TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
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This is due to the fact that the Italian personal income tax system does not admit 
negative income taxation; therefore, taxpayers with a nil net tax liability (almost all 
taxpayers with income lower than 8 thousand euros) are not affected by the tax reform. 
If the Italian PIT allowed negative income taxation, the tax reform would show a 
different distribution in terms of the tax cut among income classes; in particular, there 
would be lower gain for the top income earners and higher gain for the bottom ones. 
Only 3.20 per cent of the tax cut favours taxpayers with incomes in the range of 28-55 
thousand euros, whilst the remaining 1.55 per cent favours richer taxpayers. It can be 
observed that the RS could be higher, were the (very low) gains of the richer taxpayers 
transferred to the poorest ones. Given the structure of ‘chromosomes’ described in sub-
section 6.2, this is not possible or, at most, not likely since the GA has to balance the 
effects on RS,  ,   and   according to 33 parameters. 
Finally, Table 5 compares the inequality indexes for taxpayers according to the present 
tax structure, and those obtained by applying the new structure of the tax to the same 
pre-tax income distribution. 
 
TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
 
As can be noted, the Reynolds-Smolensky index RS is 9.08 per cent higher than the 
present value: since the overall average tax rate decreases from 18.70 per cent to 17.53 
per cent, the Kakwani index K increases by 18.05 per cent. The GA tax reform 
positively affects APKR , which decreases by 8.74 per cent. The overall redistributive 
effect RE increases by 9.29 per cent. 
The tax reform discussed here also improves redistributive indexes with respect to the 
reform implemented by the government (Table 6). More precisely, RS considerably 
increases, from 0.05707 to 0.05739. 
 
 
TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
 
This is a very large improvement, for two reasons: the two tax structures yield exactly 
the same tax revenue; and the reform implemented by the government lets some 
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taxpayers face a net income greater than the gross one (this aspect also has a great 
impact on the reduction of the Gini coefficient for net income distribution). This is not 
allowed by the GA tax reform. A similar improvement can be observed by comparing 
the overall redistributive effects RE; it is 0.05611 with the reform implemented by the 
government, and 0.05683 with the reform obtained within the GA framework. Note also 
that the GA tax reform positively affects the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index APKR : 
this index switches from a very high and unreasonable value (0.00096, that is 54 per 
cent more than the present value) to a normal value (0.00056, that is 10.19 per cent 
better than the present value). 
Finally, in order to ascertain that the GA ‘best’ tax structure ensures the highest 
admittable Reynolds-Smolensky index, given the constraints we imposed, we employ a 
sensitivity analysis for each of the 33 parameters that define the Italian PIT structure. As 
previously discussed, our fitness function is composed by four elements: the Reynolds-
Smolenky index RS, the share of loser taxpayers  , the percentage deviation from the 
target tax revenue   and the average loss   for the loser taxpayers. Given the target 
tax revenue, we are interested in obtaining the highest admittable RS with no losing 
taxpayers. 
The highest fitness function value we obtained should therefore be an absolute 
maximum for our problem. The sensitivity analysis shows that this is the case and it 
also permits us to evaluate the impact on each of the four parts that compose the fitness 
function due to a small change of each parameter of the tax (we check for small changes 
ranging from -1 per cent to +1 per cent by steps of 0.1 per cent). No small change of all 
33 parameters increases the fitness value. 
The most sensitive parameters (the ones reducing the fitness value by more than one per 
cent) are the five tax rates, the first two upper limits of the thresholds, and the 
parameters defining the ‘no tax area’. All the other tax parameters determine a small 
reduction on the fitness function value. 
Let us consider the small changes of 1t . If 1t  were increased by 1 per cent, RS would 
increase by 0.09 per cent; such a change would reduce the fitness value by 15.80 per 
cent, due to the violation on   (which would increase by 0.51 per cent) and, of course, 
the violation on   (which would increase by 898.98 per cent) as well as that on   
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(which would decrease by 24.22 per cent). A similar picture emerges when considering 
a small reduction in the level of 1t : a reduction of 1t  by 1 per cent would reduce the 
fitness value by 3.73 per cent, RS by 0.09,   by 0.51,   by 69.66, and would increase 
  by 107.14 per cent. 
 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we propose a new methodology to implement a personal income tax 
reform. In particular, given a settled tax cut decided upon by the government (a similar 
strategy can be applied if the tax revenue increases), we show how a genetic algorithm 
can be employed, in order to find out the values of all parameters defining the structure 
of the personal income tax able to satisfy a specific target. Our methodology can be 
applied to any other specific target; as an example, in this work our target is the 
maximization of the redistributive effect of the tax, while preventing all taxpayers being 
worse off with respect to the present tax structure. We apply this methodology to the 
Italian personal income taxation system for two reasons: the tax structure is quite 
complicated, and recently the government decided to reduce tax revenue by 9.324 
billion euros. The aim of this tax cut is to increase the purchasing power of ‘poor’ 
taxpayers and taxpayers belonging to the ‘middle class’, and the instrument is the 
introduction of a cash transfer (not related to the structure of the personal income tax) 
only for employees with gross incomes in the range 8-26 thousand euros (in order for 
the yearly gain to be about one thousand euros), whilst all other kinds of taxpayer are 
not affected by this money transfer. Here we show that a better and more equity-
oriented reform is possible. This methodology allows a short run reform, and can help 
policy makers when they think of a tax reform. 
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Fig. 1. Frequency density function for all individual taxpayers. 
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Fig. 2. Maximum values of the fitness function. 
  
 
Fig. 3. The effective tax credit for an employee. 
  
 
Fig. 4. The effective marginal tax rates for a celibate employee without children. 
  
 
Fig. 5. The effective tax credit for a spouse. 
 
 
  
Table 1 
Rate schedule. 
  Taxable income (euros)   
Threshold (j) Lower limit (LL) Upper limit (UL) Tax rate (t) 
1 0 15,000 0.23 
2 15,000 28,000 0.27 
3 28,000 55,000 0.38 
4 55,000 75,000 0.41 
5 75,000 - 0.43 
 
  
Table 2 
Inequality indexes for taxpayers: present values and Government’s reform ones 
Index 
Present 
value 
With cash 
transfer 
Absolute 
difference 
Percentage 
difference 
Gini coefficient for the gross income 0.44338 0.44338 0.00000 0.00 
Gini coefficient for the net income 0.39138 0.38727 -0.00412 -1.05 
Concentration coefficient for the net income 0.39076 0.38631 -0.00445 -1.14 
Gini coefficient for the net tax liability 0.68150 0.73268 0.05117 7.51 
Concentration coefficient for the net tax liability 0.67215 0.71191 0.03976 5.92 
Redistributive effect 0.05200 0.05611 0.00412 7.92 
Reynolds-Smolensky index 0.05262 0.05707 0.00445 8.46 
Kakwani index 0.22877 0.26853 0.03976 17.38 
Atkinson-Plotnik-Kakwani index 0.00062 0.00096 0.00033 54.00 
Average tax rate (%) 18.70 17.53 -1.17 -6.27 
 
  
Table 3 
Present and computed parameters of the tax. 
Parameters Present value Best Value 
t1 0.23 0.21390 
t2 0.27 0.30656 
t3 0.38 0.38994 
t4 0.41 0.40698 
t5 0.43 0.43000 
UL1 15,000 20,815.53 
UL2 28,000 27,314.58 
UL3 55,000 55,551.83 
UL4 75,000 72,757.14 
m1 8,000 11,070.33 
m2 7,500 10,031.52 
m3 7,750 10,523.08 
m4 4,800 5,841.36 
a1 502 1,489.72 
a2 470 1,392.05 
a3 486 1,393.99 
Sp
ic
2  800 1,164.16 
u 110 453.38 
w 40,000 34,994.19 
k 80,000 116,204.00 
Op
ic
2  750 665.46 
12Hp
ic  800 700.48 
22Hp
ic  900 774.79 
32Hp
ic  1,000 1,218.04 
42Hp
ic  1,100 1,218.04 
q 95,000 110,937.33 
e 15,000 41,485.32 
HF
ic
2  1,200 0.00 
tenants1 300 439.68 
tenants2 150 187.00 
tenants3 992 732.90 
expenditures1 0.19 0.19422 
expenditures2 0.36 0.41461 
 
 
Table 4 
The composition of the tax cut by income classes. 
Income class 
(thousand 
euros) 
Composition 
of the tax cut 
(%) 
Winner 
(%) 
Indifferent 
(%) 
Loser 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Average win 
(euros) 
Average loss 
(euros) 
0-8 1.93 5.94 19.31 0.10 25.35 73.1 12.6 
8-15 39.88 17.26 4.68 0.00 21.94 532.6 0.0 
15-28 53.43 34.85 0.40 0.10 35.35 343.5 53.1 
28-55 3.20 13.03 0.03 0.47 13.52 52.6 33.7 
55-75 0.89 2.06 0.03 0.09 2.19 92.5 4.6 
above 75 0.67 1.54 0.03 0.09 1.65 86.9 2.1 
Total 100.00 74.67 24.48 0.85 100.00 303.23 26.57 
 
 
Table 5 
Inequality indexes for taxpayers: present values and GA ones 
Index 
Present 
value 
Best 
value 
Absolute 
difference 
Percentage 
difference 
Gini coefficient for the gross income 0.44338 0.44338 0.00000 0.00 
Gini coefficient for the net income 0.39138 0.38655 -0.00483 -1.23 
Concentration coefficient for the net income 0.39076 0.38599 -0.00478 -1.22 
Gini coefficient for the net tax liability 0.68150 0.72235 0.04085 5.99 
Concentration coefficient for the net tax liability 0.67215 0.71344 0.04129 6.14 
Redistributive effect 0.05200 0.05683 0.00483 9.29 
Reynolds-Smolensky index 0.05262 0.05739 0.00478 9.08 
Kakwani index 0.22877 0.27006 0.04129 18.05 
Atkinson-Plotnik-Kakwani index 0.00062 0.00057 -0.00005 -8.74 
Average tax rate 18.70 17.53 -1.17 -6.27 
 
  
Table 6 
Inequality indexes for taxpayers: Government’s tax reform and GA tax reform 
Index 
With cash 
transfer 
Best 
value 
Absolute 
difference 
Percentage 
difference 
Gini coefficient for the gross income 0.44338 0.44338 0.00000 0.00 
Gini coefficient for the net income 0.38727 0.38655 -0.00071 -0.18 
Concentration coefficient for the net income 0.38631 0.38599 -0.00033 -0.08 
Gini coefficient for the net tax liability 0.73268 0.72235 -0.01032 -1.41 
Concentration coefficient for the net tax liability 0.71191 0.71344 0.00153 0.22 
Redistributive effect 0.05611 0.05683 0.00071 1.27 
Reynolds-Smolensky index 0.05707 0.05739 0.00033 0.57 
Kakwani index 0.26853 0.27006 0.00153 0.57 
Atkinson-Plotnik-Kakwani index 0.00096 0.00057 -0.00039 -40.74 
Average tax rate 17.53 17.53 0.00 0.00 
 
 
